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1 Introduction
Coalition structures are important in many real-world contexts, such as the
formation of cartels or bidding rings, alliances or trading blocs among nation
states, research joint ventures, and political parties.
These situations can be modelled through transferable utility (TU , for
short) games, in which the players partition themselves into coalitions for
the purpose of bargaining. All players in the same coalition agree before
the play that any cooperation with other players will only by carried out
collectively. That is, either all the members of the coalition take part of it
or none of them (Malawski, 2004).
Given a coalition structure, bargaining occurs between coalitions and be-
tween players in the same coalition. The main idea is that the coalitions
play among themselves as individual agents in a game among coalitions, and
then, the profit obtained by each coalition is distributed among its members.
Owen (1977) studied the allocation that arises from applying the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953b) twice: first in the game among coalitions, and then
in a reduced game inside each coalition. In this latter step, the worth a
subcoalition in the reduced game is defined as the Shapley value that the
subcoalition would get in the game among coalitions, assuming that their
partners are out.
Owen’s approach assumes a symmetric treatment for each coalition. As
Harsanyi (1977) points out, in unanimity games this procedure implies that
players would be better oﬀ bargaining by themselves than joining forces. This
is know as the join-bargaining paradox, or the Harsanyi paradox.
An alternative approach is to give a diﬀerent treatment, or weight, to each
coalition. Following this idea, Levy and McLean (1989) apply the weighted
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a; Kalai and Samet, 1987, 1988) in the game
among coalitions, as well as in the reduced games.
A natural weight for each coalition is its own size. In fact, a motivation
for the weighted Shapley value is precisely the diﬀerence in size1. Moreover,
Kalai and Samet (1987, Corollary 2 in Section 7) show that the size of coali-
tions are appropriate weights for the players. The reason is that if we force
the players in a coalition to work together (by destroying their resources
when they are not all together), then the aggregated Shapley value of each
1Kalai and Samet (1987) present the example of large constituencies with many indi-
viduals, in contrast with constituencies composed by a small number of individuals.
2
coalition in the new game coincides with the weighted Shapley value of the
game among coalitions, with weights given by the size of the coalition2.
It is then reasonable to apply the Levy and McLean value with intracoali-
tional symmetry and weights given by the size of the coalition. However, in
Levy and McLean’s model, the weight of the subcoalitions in the reduced
game remains constant, even though these subcoalitions may have diﬀer-
ent size. An alternative approach is to vary the weight of the coalitions in
the reduced game. Vidal-Puga (2006) follows this approach to define a new
coalitional value. This new coalitional value does not present the Harsanyi
paradox.
In this paper, we characterize the above coalitional values: the coalitional
Owen value (Owen, 1977), the coalitional Levy-McLean weighted value (Levy
and McLean, 1989) with the weights given by the size of the coalition, and
the new value presented by Vidal-Puga (2006). These three values have in
common the following feature: First, the worth of the grand coalition is di-
vided among the coalitions following either the Shapley value (Owen), or the
weighted Shapley value with weights given by the size of the coalitions (Levy
and McLean, Vidal-Puga), and then the profit obtained by each coalition is
distributed among its members following the Shapley value.
Some of the axioms used in the characterizations (eﬃciency, intracoali-
tional symmetry, and linearity) are standard in the literature, others (in-
dependence of null coalitions and two intracoalitional versions of balanced
contributions) are used in many diﬀerent frameworks. Moreover, we intro-
duce new properties in this kind of problems: coordination (which asserts
that internal changes in a coalition which do no aﬀect the game among coali-
tions, do not influence the final payment of the rest of the players) and two
properties of sharing in unanimity games (which establish how should the
payment be under the grand coalition unanimity game).
The properties of eﬃciency, linearity, intracoalitional symmetry and inde-
pendence of null coalitions are natural extensions of the classical properties
that characterize the Shapley value (eﬃciency, linearity, symmetry and null
player, respectively) to the game among coalitions. On the other hand, the
properties of balanced contributions are applied to the game inside a coali-
tion, and each of them is a natural extension of the property of balanced
2Another possibility is to give the worth of any coalition to any of its nonempty sub-
coalitions. In this case, the aggregated Shapley value of each coalition coincides with the
weigthed Shapley value of the dual game among coalitions (see Kalai and Samet, 1987,
Section 7, for further details).
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contributions that also characterizes, with eﬃciency, the Shapley value (My-
erson, 1980). Hence, the three values proposed here can be seen as natural
extensions of the Shapley value for games with coalition structure. Addi-
tionally, the property of coordination formalizes the idea presented by Owen
that the players inside a coalition negotiate among them, but always assum-
ing that the rest of the coalitions remain together (see for example the game
v1 defined by Kalai and Samet, 1987, Section 7).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
In Section 3 we define a family that includes the three coalitional values.
In Section 4 we present the properties used in the characterization and we
study which properties satisfy the coalitional values. In Section 5 we present
the characterization results. In Section 6 we prove that the properties are
independent. In Section 7 we present some concluding remarks.
2 Notation
Let U = {1, 2, ...} be the (infinite) set of potential players.
Given a finite subset N ⊂ U , let Π(N) denote the set of all orders in
N . Given π ∈ Π(N), let Pre(i,π) denote the set of the elements in N which
come before i in the order given by π, i.e. Pre(i,π) = {j ∈ N : π(j) < π(i)}.
For any S ⊂ N , πS denotes the order induced in S by π (for all i, j ∈ S,
πS(i) < πS(j) if and only if π(i) < π(j)).
A transfer utility game, TU game, or simply a game, is a pair (N, v) where
N ⊂ U is finite and v : 2N → R satisfies v(∅) = 0. When N is clear, we can
also denote (N, v) as v. Given a TU game (N, v) and S ⊂ N , v(S) is called
the worth of S. Given S ⊂ N , we denote the restriction of (N, v) to S as
(S, v).
For simplicity, we write S ∪ i instead of S ∪ {i}, N\i instead of N\{i},
and v (i) instead of v ({i}).
Two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in (N, v) if v (S ∪ i) = v (S ∪ j) for
all S ⊂ N\ {i, j}. A player i ∈ N is null in (N, v) if v(T ∪ i) = v(T ) for
all T ⊂ N\i. The set of non-null players in (N, v) is the carrier of (N, v),
and we denote it as Carr (N, v). Given two games (N, v), (N,w), the game
(N, v+w) is defined as (v+w)(S) = v(S)+w(S) for all S ⊂ N . Given a game
(N, v) and a real number α, the game (N,αv) is defined as (αv) (S) = αv (S)
for all S ⊂ N .
Given N ⊂ U finite, we call coalition structure over N a partition of the
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player set N , i.e. C = {C1, C2, ...., Cm} ⊂ 2N is a coalition structure if it
satisfies
S
Cq∈C Cq = N and Cq ∩Cr = ∅ when q 6= r. We also assume Cq 6= ∅
for all q.
We say that Cq ∈ C is a null coalition if all its members are null players.
For any S ⊂ N, we denote the restriction of C to the players in S as CS,
i.e. CS = {Cq ∩ S : Cq ∈ C and Cq ∩ S 6= ∅}.
For any S ⊂ Cq ∈ C, we will frequently study the case in which the
players in Cq\S leave the game. In this case, we write CS instead of the more
cumbersome CN\(Cq\S).
Given a game (N, v) and a coalition structure C = {C1, C2, ...., Cm}
over N , the game among coalitions is the TU game (M,v/C) where M =
{1, 2, ...m} and (v/C) (Q) = v
³S
q∈QCq
´
for all Q ⊂M .
We denote the game (N, v) with coalition structure C = {C1, C2, ...., Cm}
over N as (N, v, C) or (v, C).When N and C are clear, we also write v instead
of (N, v, C).
Given S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, the unanimity game with carrier S, (N, uSN) is
defined as uSN(T ) = 1 if S ⊂ T and uSN(T ) = 0 otherwise, for all T ⊂ N .
A value is a function that assigns to each game (N, v) a vector in RN
representing the amount that each player in N expects to get in the game.
One of the most important values in TU games is the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953b). We denote the Shapley value of the TU game (N, v) as Sh(N, v) ∈
RN .
Similarly, a coalitional value is a function that assigns to each game with
coalition structure (N, v, C) a vector inRN . Each value can also be considered
as a coalitional value by simply ignoring the coalition structure. Hence, we
define the coalitional Shapley value of the game (N, v, C) as Sh (N, v, C) =
Sh (N, v). One of the most important coalitional values is the Owen value
(Owen, 1977).
Another generalization for a value is the following: a weighted value φω is
a function that assigns to each TU game (N, v) and each x ∈ RN++ a vector
φx in RN . For each i ∈ N , xi is the weight of player i. We will say that
a weighted value φω extends or generalizes a value φ if φx (N, v) = φ (N, v)
for any weight vector x with xi = xj for all i, j ∈ N . The most prominent
weighted generalization of the Shapley value is the weighted Shapley value
Shω (Shapley (1953a), Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988)).
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3 Games with coalition structure
We now focus on games with coalition structure. Fix C = {C1, ..., Cm} and
let M = {1, ...,m}. For each pair (γ,φω), where γ is a value and φω is a
weighted value, we define two coalitional values γ [φω] and γ hφωi. In both
cases, the idea is to divide the worth of the grand coalition in two steps: In
the first step, φω is used to divide the worth of the grand coalition in the
game among coalitions, with weights given by the size of each coalition. In
the second step, γ is used to divide the worth inside each coalition.
For each coalition structure C = {C1, C2, ..., Cm} over N , let σ (C) ∈ RM+
be defined as σq (C) = |Cq| for all3 q ∈ M . Given Cq ∈ C, the reduced TU
game with fixed weights
³
Cq, v
[φω]N
Cq
´
is defined as
v
[φω]N
Cq
(S) := φσ(C)q
¡
M,v/CS¢
for all S ⊂ Cq. The reduced TU game with relaxed weights
³
Cq, v
hφωiN
Cq
´
is
defined as
v
hφωiN
Cq
(S) := φ
σ(CS)
q
¡
M,v/CS¢
for all S ⊂ Cq.
Thus, both v[φ
ω ]N
Cq
(S) and vhφ
ωiN
Cq
(S) are interpreted as the value that
φω assigns to coalition S in the game among coalitions assuming that the
members of Cq\S are out. In the first case, coalition S maintains the weight
of the original coalition Cq. In the second case, coalition S plays with a
weight proportional to its own (reduced) size.
In the particular case φx = φ for all x, both reduced TU games coincide
and we write
³
Cq, v
(φ)N
Cq
´
instead of
³
Cq, v
[φω]N
Cq
´
or
³
Cq, v
hφωiN
Cq
´
.
Definition 1 Given a value γ and a weighted value φω, we define respectively
the coalitional values γ [φω] and γ hφωi as
γ [φω]i (N, v, C) := γi
³
Cq, v
[φω ]N
Cq
´
3To be precise, given C = {C1, C2, ..., Cm} over N , σ (C) = σ (C,M, f) where f : C →M
is a one-to-one correspondence that matches each coalition in C with each index in M .
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and
γ hφωii (N, v, C) := γi
³
Cq, v
hφωiN
Cq
´
for all i ∈ Cq ∈ C.
In the particular case φx = φ for all x, both expressions coincide and
hence we write γ (φ) := γ [φω] = γ hφωi .
We concentrate on three particular members of this family, that have
been previously studied in the literature:
Example 2 Sh (Sh) is the Owen value (Owen, 1977).
Sh [Shω] is the weighted coalitional value with intracoalitional symmetry,
and weights given by the size of the coalitions (Levy and McLean, 1989).
Sh hShωi has been studied by Vidal-Puga (2006).
There exist other relevant coalitional values that belong to this family.
Let Ba be the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf 1965, Owen 1975). Let In be the
individual value (Owen4, 1978) defined as Ini (N, v) = v ({i}) for all i ∈ N .
Given p ∈ [0, 1], let Bp be the p-binomial value (Puente, 2000). Let DP be
the Deegan-Packel value (Deegan and Packel, 1979). Let LSP be the least
square prenucleolus (Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo, 1996).
Example 3 Sh (In) is the Aumann-Drèze value (Aumann and Drèze, 1974).
Ba (Ba) is the Banzhaf-Owen value (Owen 1975).
Sh (Ba) is the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value (Alonso-Meijide and
Fiestras-Janeiro, 2002).
Ba (Sh) is defined and studied by Amer, Carreras and Giménez (2002).
{Sh (Bp)}p∈[0,1] is the family of symmetric coalitional binomial values
(Carreras and Puente, 2006).
DP (DP ) and LSP (LSP ) are defined and studied by Młodak (2003).
4 Properties
In this section we present some properties of the values. Moreover, we provide
several results.
4Owen uses the term dictatorial instead of individual.
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4.1 Classical properties
Eﬃciency (Eff) For any game (N, v, C), P
i∈N
fi (N, v, C) = v (N) .
That is, the worth of the grand coalition is distributed.
Linearity (Lin) Given (N, v, C), (N,w, C) and real numbers α and β,
f (N,αv + βw, C) = αf (N, v, C) + βf (N,w, C) .
That is, if a game is a linear combination of two games, the value assigns
the linear combination of the values of the games.
Symmetry (Sym) Given two symmetric players i, j ∈ N in a game (N, v, C),
fi (N, v, C) = fj (N, v, C).
That is, two symmetric players in (N, v) receive the same.
Null Player (NP) Given a null player i ∈ N in a game (N, v, C), fi (N, v, C) =
0.
That is, any null player receives zero.
Independence of Null Players (INP) Given a null player i ∈ N in a
game (N, v, C) ,
fj (N, v, C) = fj
¡
N\i, v, CN\i
¢
for all j ∈ N\i.
That is, no agent gets a diﬀerent value if a null player is removed from
the game.
We say that a weighted value φω satisfies some property if φx satisfies this
property for each x.
Proposition 4 a) The Shapley value Sh is the only value that satisfies Eff ,
Lin, Sym and INP .
b) The weighted Shapley value Shω satisfies INP .
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Proof. a) It is well-known that Sh satisfies Eff , Lin and Sym. It is also
clear that Sh satisfies INP . On the other hand, it is straightforward to check
that Eff and INP imply NP . Since Sh is the only value that satisfies Eff ,
Lin, Sym and NP (Shapley, 1953b), we deduce the result.
b) From Kalai and Samet (1987, Theorem 1) and a classical induction
hypothesis on the number of players, it is straightforward to check that Shω
satisfies INP .
Lin and Eff can be adapted to games with coalition structure without
changes. For Sym and INP , we will apply them inside the coalitions and to
null coalitions, respectively:
Intracoalitional Symmetry (IS) Given two symmetric players in the same
coalition i, j ∈ Cq ∈ C, fi (N, v, C) = fj (N, v, C) .
Independence of Null Coalitions (INC) Given a game (N, v, C) and a
null coalition Cq ∈ C, fi (N, v, C) = fi
¡
N\Cq, v, CN\Cq
¢
for all i ∈
N\Cq.
INC asserts that if a coalition is null, it does not influence the allocation
within the rest of the players. It is a weaker property than INP . Notice
that INC and Eff imply that the aggregated payment of the agents in a
null coalition is zero.
Proposition 5 a) If both γ and φω satisfy Eff , then both γ [φω] and γ hφωi
satisfy Eff .
b) If both γ and φω satisfy Lin, then both γ [φω] and γ hφωi satisfy Lin.
c) If γ satisfies Sym, then both γ [φω] and γ hφωi satisfy IS.
d) If φω satisfies INP , then both γ [φω] and γ hφωi satisfy INC.
Proof. Parts a), b) and c) are straightforward from the definition.
d) We prove the result for γ [φω]. The result for γ hφωi is analogous. Let
C = {C1, ..., Cm} and let Cq ∈ C be a null coalition. DenoteM = {1, 2, ...,m}.
To prove that γ [φω]i (N, v, C) = γ [φω]i (N\Cq, v, CN\Cq) for all i ∈ N\Cq it
is enough to prove that v[φ
ω]N
Cr
(S) = v
[φω ]N\Cq
Cr
(S) for all S ⊂ Cr ∈ C\Cq.
Take S ⊂ Cr ∈ C\Cq. By definition,
v
[φω ]N
Cr
(S) = φσ(C)r (M,v/CS).
Since φσ(C) satisfies INP , we have
φσ(C)r
¡
M, v/CS¢ = φσ(C)r ³M\q, v/CSN\Cq´ .
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Notice that there is no ambiguities in the notation v/CSN\Cq because
¡CS¢
N\Cq =¡CN\Cq¢S. By definition,
φσ(C)r
³
M\q, v/CSN\Cq
´
= v
[φω]N\Cq
Cr
(S).
Combining the three last expressions we obtain the result.
Corollary 6 Sh (Sh), Sh [Shω] and Sh hShωi satisfy Eff , Lin, IS and
INC.
4.2 Properties of Balanced Contributions
The principle of Balanced Contributions is used in diﬀerent contexts. Myer-
son (1977) was the first to use it for games with graphs. He called it Fairness.
Later, Myerson (1980) characterized the Shapley value with balanced con-
tributions and eﬃciency. The principle of balanced contributions has also
been used in other contexts: Amer and Carreras (1995) and Calvo, Lasaga
and Winter (1996) characterized the Owen value; Calvo and Santos (2000)
characterized a value for multi-choice games; Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga
(2005) characterized an extension of the Owen value for non-transferable
utility games; Calvo and Santos (2006) characterized the subsidy-free se-
rial cost sharing method (Moulin, 1995) in discrete cost allocation problems;
and Alonso-Meijide, Carreras and Puente (2007) characterized a parametric
family of coalitional values.
Balanced Contributions (BC) Given a game (N, v), for all i, j ∈ N ,
fi (N, v)− fi (N\j, v) = fj (N, v)− fj (N\i, v) .
This property states that for any two players, the amount that each player
would gain or lose by the other’s withdrawal from the game should be equal.
A remarkable property of this principle is that it completely characterizes
the Shapley value with the only help of eﬃciency.
Proposition 7 (Myerson, 1980) Sh is the only value that satisfies Eff and
BC.
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A similar, yet diﬀerent version of BC arises when we make the players to
become null, instead of leaving the game: Given (N, v) and i ∈ N , we define
(N, v−i) as v−i (S) = v (S ∩ (N\i)) for all S ⊂ N . Hence, in (N, v−i) player
i becomes a null player.
Null Balanced Contributions (NBC) Given a game (N, v), for all i, j ∈
N ,
fi (N, v)− fi
¡
N, v−j
¢
= fj (N, v)− fj
¡
N, v−i
¢
.
Under Eff and Sym, NBC and BC are equivalent:
Proposition 8 Sh is the only value that satisfies Eff , NBC and Sym.
Proof. It is well-known that Sh satisfies Eff , Sym and INP . Since Sh
satisfies Eff and INP , we have Shi (N, v−j) = Shi (N\j, v) for any null
player j and any i ∈ N\j. Hence, BC and NBC are equivalent for Sh.
Since Sh satisfies BC (Proposition 7), Sh also satisfies NBC.
To see the uniqueness, let f be a value satisfying these properties. Fix
(N, v). We proceed by induction on |Carr (N, v)|. If |Carr (N, v)| = 0,
the result holds from Eff and Sym. Assume the result holds for less than
|Carr (N, v)| non-null players, with |Carr (N, v)| > 0. Let i ∈ N .
Assume first that player i is a null player. Obviously, (N, v) = (N, v−i).
For any j ∈ Carr (N, v), under NBC,
fi (N, v)− fi
¡
N, v−j
¢
= fj (N, v)− fj
¡
N, v−i
¢
= 0
and hence fi (N, v) = fi (N, v−j). By induction hypothesis, fi (N, v) =
Shi (N, v
−j) = 0 because i is also a null player in (N, v−j) .
Assume now i ∈ Carrier (N, v). Under NBC, fi (N, v) − fi (N, v−j) =
fj (N, v)− fj (N, v−i) for all j ∈ N\i, and hence
(n− 1) fi (N, v)−
X
j∈N\Carr(N,v)
fi
¡
N, v−j
¢
−
X
j∈Carr(N,v)\i
fi
¡
N, v−j
¢
=
X
j∈N\i
fj (N, v)−
X
j∈N\i
fj
¡
N, v−i
¢
.
Obviously, fi (N, v) = fi (N, v−j) for all j ∈ N\Carr (N, v). Hence,
(|Carr (N, v)|− 1) fi (N, v)−
X
j∈Carr(N,v)\i
fi
¡
N, v−j
¢
=
X
j∈N\i
fj (N, v)−
X
j∈N\i
fj
¡
N, v−i
¢
.
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Under Eff ,
P
j∈N\i fi (N, v) = v (N)− fi (N, v) and hence,
fi (N, v) =
1
|Carr (N, v)|

v (N) +
X
j∈Carr(N,v)\i
fi
¡
N, v−j
¢
−
X
j∈N\i
fj
¡
N, v−i
¢ .
Under the induction hypothesis, f (N, v−j) = Sh (N, v−j) for all j ∈
Carr (N, v) and hence
fi (N, v) =
1
|Carr (N, v)|

v (N) +
X
j∈Carr(N,v)\i
Shi
¡
N, v−j
¢
−
X
j∈N\i
Shj
¡
N, v−i
¢
from where we deduce that fi (N, v) is unique for all i ∈ Carr (N, v).
Remark 9 Sym is needed in the previous characterization. Let f{1,2} be de-
fined as follows: If {1, 2} ⊆ N , then f{1,2}1 (N, v) = Sh1 (N, v)+1, f{1,2}2 (N, v) =
Sh2 (N, v) − 1, and f{1,2}i (N, v) = Shi (N, v) otherwise. If {1, 2} * N ,
then f{1,2} (N, v) = Sh (N, v). This value satisfies Eff and NBC, but
f{1,2} 6= Sh.
Remark 10 Young (1985) characterized Sh as the only value that satisfies
Eff , Sym and Strong Monotonicity (SM). This last property says that
fi (N, v) ≥ fi (N, v0) whereas v (S ∪ i) − v (S) ≥ v0 (S ∪ i) − v0 (S) for all
S ⊂ N\i. Hence, Proposition 8 implies that NBC and SM are equivalent
under Eff and Sym.
In order to keep the essence of the Shapley value at the intracoalitional
level, we force (null) balanced contributions inside a coalition:
Balanced Intracoalitional Contributions (BIC) Given a game (N, v, C),
for all i, j ∈ Cq ∈ C,
fi (N, v, C)− fi
¡
N\j, v, CN\j
¢
= fj (N, v, C)− fj
¡
N\i, v, CN\i
¢
.
This property states that for any two agents that belong to the same
coalition in C, the amount that each agent would gain or lose by the other’s
withdrawal from the game should be equal.
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Null Balanced Intracoalitional Contributions (NBIC) Given a game
(N, v, C), for all i, j ∈ Cq ∈ C,
fi (N, v, C)− fi
¡
N, v−j, C¢ = fj (N, v, C)− fj ¡N, v−i, C¢ .
This property states that for any two agents that belong to the same
coalition in C, the amount that each agent would gain or lose if the other
becomes null should be equal.
Proposition 11 a) If γ satisfies NBC, then γ [φω] satisfies NBIC.
b) If γ satisfies BC, then γ hφωi satisfies BIC.
Proof. Fix Cq ∈ C and i, j ∈ Cq.
a) By definition,
γ [φω]i (N, v, C)− γ [φω]i (N, v−j, C) = γi
³
Cq, v
[φω]N
Cq
´
− γi
³
Cq,
¡
v−j
¢[φω ]N
Cq
´
.
By definition of (N, v−j), we have v[φ
ω ]N
Cq
(S) = (v−j)
[φω]N
Cq
(S) for all
S ⊂ Cq\j. Hence,
³
v
[φω]N
Cq
´−j
(S) = (v−j)
[φω ]N
Cq
(S) for all S ⊂ Cq, which
implies that
µ
Cq,
³
v
[φω]N
Cq
´−j¶
coincides with
³
Cq, (v
−j)
[φω ]N
Cq
´
and so, ex-
pression above can be restated as
γ [φω]i (N, v, C)− γ [φω]i (N, v−j, C) = γi
³
Cq, v
[φω ]N
Cq
´
− γi
µ
Cq,
³
v
[φω]N
Cq
´−j¶
.
Since γ satisfies NBC, we have
γ [φω]i (N, v, C)− γ [φω]i (N, v−j, C) = γj
³
Cq, v
[φω]N
Cq
´
− γj
µ
Cq,
³
v
[φω ]N
Cq
´−i¶
.
Reasoning as before, it is straightforward to check that
γ [φω]j (N, v, C)− γ [φω]j (N, v−i, C) = γj
³
Cq, v
[φω ]N
Cq
´
− γj
µ
Cq,
³
v
[φω]N
Cq
´−i¶
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and hence the result.
b) By definition,
γ hφωii (N, v, C)− γ hφωii (N\j, v, CN\j) = γi
³
Cq, v
hφωiN
Cq
´
− γi
³
Cq\j, vhφ
ωiN\j
Cq\j
´
.
By definition of the reduced game, vhφ
ωiN
Cq
(S) = v
hφωiN\j
Cq\j (S) for all S ⊂
Cq\j. Thus,
³
Cq\j, vhφ
ωiN
Cq
´
coincides with
³
Cq\j, vhφ
ωiN\j
Cq\j
´
and so, expres-
sion above can be restated as
γ hφωii (N, v, C)− γ hφωii (N\j, v, CN\j) = γi
³
Cq, v
hφωiN
Cq
´
− γi
³
Cq\j, vhφ
ωiN
Cq
´
.
Since γ satisfies BC, we have
γ hφωii (N, v, C)− γ hφωii (N\j, v, CN\j) = γj
³
Cq, v
hφωiN
Cq
´
− γj
³
Cq\i, vhφ
ωiN
Cq
´
.
Reasoning as before, it is straightforward to check that
γ hφωij (N, v, C)− γ hφωij (N\i, v, CN\j) = γj
³
Cq, v
hφωiN
Cq
´
− γj
³
Cq\i, vhφ
ωiN
Cq
´
and hence the result.
Corollary 12 The Owen value Sh (Sh) satisfies both BIC andNBIC; Sh [Shω]
satisfies NBIC; Sh hShωi satisfies BIC.
Even though Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 show thatBC andNBC are
equivalent under Eff and Sym, this is not the case for their intracoalitional
versions:
Remark 13 a) Sh [Shω] does not satisfy BIC. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v
defined as v (S) = 1 if {1, 2} ⊂ S or {1, 3} ⊂ S, and v (S) = 0 otherwise.
Let C = {{1, 2} , {3}}. Then,
Sh [Shω]1 (N, v, C)− Sh [Shω]1
¡
N\2, v, CN\2
¢
=
5
6
− 1
2
=
1
3
Sh [Shω]2 (N, v, C)− Sh [Shω]2
¡
N\1, v, CN\1
¢
=
1
6
− 0 = 1
6
.
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b) Sh hShωi does not satisfy NBIC. Let (N, v, C) be defined as in the
previous section. Then,
Sh hShωi1 (N, v, C)− Sh hShωi1
¡
N, v−2, C¢ = 3
4
− 7
12
=
−1
6
Sh hShωi2 (N, v, C)− Sh hShωi2
¡
N, v−1, C¢ = 1
4
− 0 = 1
4
.
4.3 Other properties
Coordination (Co) For all v, v0 and Cq ∈ C, if
v
Ã
T ∪
[
Cr∈R
Cr
!
= v0
Ã
T ∪
[
Cr∈R
Cr
!
for all T ⊂ Cq and all R ⊂ C\Cq, then,
fi (N, v, C) = fi (N, v0, C) for all i ∈ Cq.
This property says that, given a coalition Cq, if there are changes inside
other coalitions, but these changes do not aﬀect to the worth of any subset
of Cq with the rest of coalitions, then these internal changes in the other
coalitions do not aﬀect the final payment of each agent in Cq.
Proposition 14 γ (φ), γ [φω] and γ hφωi satisfy Co.
Proof. Let C, v and v0 such that v
µ
T ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
= v0
µ
T ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
for all
T ⊂ Cq and all R ⊂ C\{Cq}. It is enough to prove that v[φ
ω]N
Cq
(S) = v
0[φω]N
Cq
(S)
and vhφ
ωiN
Cq
(T ) = v
0hφωiN
Cq
(T ) for all S ⊂ Cq. By the condition satisfied by
v and v0 we have that
¡
M,v/CS¢ = ¡M,v0/CS¢ for all S ⊂ Cq. Hence,
φσ(C)q
¡
M,v/CS¢ = φσ(C)q ¡M,v0/CS¢ and φσ(CS)q ¡M,v/CS¢ = φσ(CS)q ¡M,v0/CS¢
for all S ⊂ Cq. By the definition of the reduced games, we have the result.
Frequently, is interpreted that players form coalitions in order to im-
prove their bargaining strength (Hart and Kurz, 1983). However, as Harsanyi
(1977) points out, the bargaining strength does not improve in general. An
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individual can be worse oﬀ bargaining as a member of a coalition than bar-
gaining alone. This is what is known as the “Harsanyi paradox”.
The following property avoids the “Harsanyi paradox” in the case where
all the agents are symmetric. In the unanimity game with carrier N all the
agents are necessary to obtain a positive payment. Hence it seems reasonable
that their assignment should be independent of the coalitional structure:
Equal Sharing in Unanimity Games (ESUG) For any C,
fi
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
= fj
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
for all i, j ∈ N .
This property asserts that under the unanimity game with carrierN , each
agent should receive the same payment, regardless of C.
The Owen value does not satisfy ESUG but a weighted version:
Inverse Proportional Sharing in Unanimity Games (IPSUG) For any
game
¡
N, uNN , C
¢
, and any coalitions Cq, Cr ∈ C,
|Cq| fi
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
= |Cr| fj
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
for all i ∈ Cq and j ∈ Cr.
This property asserts that under the unanimity game with carrier N ,
each agent should receive a payment inversely proportional to the size of the
coalition he belongs to. A similar property is the following:
Coalitional Symmetry in Unanimity Games (CSUG) For any game
¡
N, uNN , C
¢
,
and any coalitions Cq, Cr ∈ C,X
i∈Cq
fi
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
=
X
i∈Cr
fj
¡
N, uNN , C
¢
.
It is straightforward to check that, under IS, CSUG is equivalent to
IPSUG. We use IPSUG because it follows the same formulation as ESUG.
In addition to Eff , either ESUG or IPSUG would determine the coali-
tional value for
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
:
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Proposition 15 a) If a coalitional value f satisfies Eff and ESUG, then
fi
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
= 1|N | for all i ∈ N .
b) If a coalitional value f satisfies Eff and IPSUG, then fi
¡
N,uNN , C
¢
=
1
|Cq ||C| for all i ∈ Cq ∈ C.
Proof. Part a) is trivial. As for part b), notice that IPSUG implies that
all the coalitions should receive the same aggregate value, and hence, under
Eff , this value is 1|C| . Moreover, IPSUG also implies that all the players in
the same coalition should receive the same value. Hence the result.
However, these properties are still very weak, since they only apply to
a very specific unanimity game uNN . The following result gives us suﬃcient
conditions to have these properties for the family of coalitional values defined
before:
Proposition 16 a) If both γ and φω satisfy Eff and Sym, then γ [φω] and
γ hφωi satisfy IPSUG.
b) If γ satisfies Eff and Sym, φω satisfies Eff , and φxi
¡
N, uNN
¢
/xi =
φxj
¡
N,uNN
¢
/xj for all i, j ∈ N and all x ∈ RN+ , then γ [φω] and γ hφωi satisfy
ESUG.
Proof. Clearly,
¡
M,uNN/C
¢
=
¡
M,uMM
¢
and
¡
M,uNN/CS
¢
= (M,null) for all
S Ã Cq ∈ C, where null (Q) = 0 for all Q ⊂M .
a) Under Eff and Sym of φω, we have
¡
uNN
¢[φω ]N
Cq
=
¡
uNN
¢hφωiN
Cq
= 1|C|u
Cq
Cq
for all Cq ∈ C. Under Eff and Sym of γ, we conclude that γ [φω]i (N, v, C) =
γ hφωii (N, v, C) = 1|Cq||C| for all i ∈ Cq ∈ C and hence the result.
b) Under our hypothesis over φω, we have
¡
uNN
¢[φω]N
Cq
=
¡
uNN
¢hφωiN
Cq
=
|Cq |
|N | u
Cq
Cq
for all Cq ∈ C. Under Eff and Sym of γ, we conclude that γ [φω]i (N, v, C) =
γ hφωii (N, v, C) = 1|Cq|
|Cq |
|N | =
1
|N | for all i ∈ Cq ∈ C and hence the result.
Corollary 17 a) The Owen value Sh (Sh) satisfies IPSUG.
b) Sh [Shω] and Sh hShωi satisfy ESUG.
5 Characterization
In this section, we present our main result:
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Theorem 18 Among all the coalitional values that satisfy Eff , Lin, INC
and Co,
a) the Owen value Sh (Sh) is the only one that satisfies NBIC, IPSUG
and IS;
b) the Owen value Sh (Sh) is the only one that satisfies BIC and IPSUG;
c) Sh [Shω] is the only one that satisfies NBIC, ESUG and IS; and
d) Sh hShωi is the only one that satisfies BIC and ESUG.
Proof. We know by Corollary 6, Corollary 12, Proposition 14 and Corollary
17 that these rules satisfy the corresponding properties. Let C = {C1, ...Cm}
be a coalition structure. Let M = {1, ...,m}.
Let f1 and f2 be two coalitional values satisfying Eff , Lin, INC, Co,
and the properties stated in one of the four sections. We prove f1 = f2 by
induction over the number of players n. If n = 1, under Eff , f1(N, v, C) =
f2(N, v, C) and hence the result holds.
Assume the result holds for less than n players. Now we prove that the
result holds for n players.
It is well-know that every TU game can be expressed as a linear combi-
nation of unanimity games. Since f1 and f2 satisfy Lin, we can restrict our
proof to unanimity games.
Let S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. Consider the game uSN . First, we will show that it
is enough to restrict the proof to the case where all the coalitions intersect
the carrier S. To prove that, suppose that there exists some coalition, say
Cm ∈ C, that does not intersect the carrier; that is, S ∩ Cm = ∅.
Clearly, Cm is a null coalition. Under INC, fxi (N,u
S
N , C) = fxi (N\Cm, uSN\Cm , CN\Cm)
for all i ∈ N\Cm and x = 1, 2. By induction hypothesis,
f1i
¡
N\Cm, uSN\Cm , CN\Cm
¢
= f2i
¡
N\Cm, uSN\Cm , CN\Cm
¢
for all i ∈ N\Cm. Moreover, as an implication of INC andEff ,
P
i∈Cm
fxi (N,u
S
N , C) =
0 for x = 1, 2. We still need to prove that every agent in Cm receives the
same under both coalitional values. In particular, we will prove that each of
them receives zero. We have two possibilities:
Cases a and c (the coalitional values satisfy IS): Under IS, it is clear
that fxi (N, u
S
N , C) = 0 for all i ∈ Cm, x = 1, 2, because all the players in Cm
are symmetric and their values sum up zero.
Cases b and d (the coalitional values satisfy BIC): If |Cm| = 1, it is
clear that fxi
¡
N,uSN , C
¢
= 0 for all i ∈ Cm, i = 1, 2. Assume fxi
¡
N,uSN , C
¢
=
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0 for all null coalitions with less than l players. If |Cm| = l, l > 1, from BIC,
fxi (N,u
S
N , C)− fxi (N\j, uSN\j, CN\j) = fxj (N,uSN , C)− fxj (N\i, uSN\i, CN\i)
for all i, j ∈ Cm, x = 1, 2. By induction hypothesis on |Cm|, fxi (N\j, uSN\j, CN\j) =
fxj (N\i, uSN\i, CN\i) = 0, for all i, j ∈ Cm, x = 1, 2. Hence, we have that
fxi (N,u
S
N , C) = fxj (N,uSN , C) for all i, j ∈ Cm and x = 1, 2. Moreover, sinceP
i∈Cm
fxi (N,u
S
N , C) = 0, we obtain that fxi (N, uSN , C) = 0 for all i ∈ Cm and
x = 1, 2.
From now on, we assume that S ∩ Cq 6= ∅ for all Cq ∈ C.
Fix i ∈ Cq ∈ C. We should prove that f1i (N,uSN , C) = f2i (N,uSN , C).
Let Sq := Cq ∩ S and T := Sq ∪ (N\Cq).
Claim 19
uSN
Ã
T 0 ∪
[
Cr∈R
Cr
!
= uTN
Ã
T 0 ∪
[
Cr∈R
Cr
!
for all T 0 ⊂ Cq and all R ⊂ C\Cq.
Proof. Fix T 0 ⊂ Cq. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: Sq ⊂ T 0 and R = C\Cq. In this case, S ⊂
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
and T ⊂
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
. Thus by definition of uSN and u
T
N , we have that
uSN
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
= uTN
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
= 1.
Case 2: Sq 6⊂ T 0. In this case, there exists some i ∈ Sq such that
i 6∈ T 0, and so, S 6⊂
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
and T 6⊂
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
. Hence,
uSN
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
= uTN
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
= 0.
Case 3: R 6= C\Cq. In this case, there exists some Ck ∈ C\Cq such that
Ck 6∈ R. Since by hypothesis, Cr ∩ S 6= ∅ for all Cr ∈ C, we have that S 6⊂µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
and T 6⊂
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
. Hence, uSN
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
=
uTN
µ
T 0 ∪
S
Cr∈R
Cr
¶
= 0.
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Since we are under the assumptions ofCo (Claim 19), we have fxi (N, u
S
N , C) =
fxi (N,u
T
N , C) for x = 1, 2. Hence, it is enough to prove that f1i (N, uTN , C) =
f2i (N,u
T
N , C). As a previous step, consider the unanimity game
¡
N,uNN
¢
. By
an analogous argument as in the proof of Claim 19, we have
uTN
Ã
T 0 ∪
[
Cl∈Q
Cl
!
= uNN
Ã
T 0 ∪
[
Cl∈Q
Cl
!
for all T 0 ⊂ Cr ∈ C\Cq and all Q ⊂ C\Cr. Under Co,
fxj (N,u
N
N , C) = fxj (N, uTN , C) (1)
for all j ∈ N\Cq.
We have two possibilities:
Cases a and c (the coalitional values satisfyNBIC and IS): UnderEff
and ESUG/IPSUG, by Proposition 15, we have
P
i∈Cq f
x
i (N, u
T
N , C) = βq
where βq =
1
|C| (when f
x satisfies IPSUG) or βq =
|Cq |
|N | (when f
x satisfies
ESUG).
Under IS, we have fxi (N,u
T
N , C) = fxj (N,uTN , C) for all i, j ∈ Sq (respec-
tively, i, j ∈ Cq\Sq) and x = 1, 2. Hence it is enough to prove fxi (N,uTN) = 0
for all i ∈ Cq\Sq, x = 1, 2. This is clear for Sq = Cq. Let i ∈ Sq and j ∈ Cq\Sq.
Player j is a null player in (N,uTN) and hence (N,u
T
N) = (N,
¡
uTN
¢−j
). Under
NBIC,
0 = fxi (N,u
T
N)− fxi
³
N,
¡
uTN
¢−j´
= fxj (N,u
T
N)− fxj
³
N,
¡
uTN
¢−i´
.
Obviously, (N,
¡
uTN
¢−i
) is the null game
¡
uTN
¢−i
(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N
and thus Eff and IS imply fxj (N,
¡
uTN
¢−i
) = 0. Thus, fxj (N, u
T
N) = 0 for
x = 1, 2.
Cases b and d (the coalitional values satisfy BIC): Fix x ∈ {1, 2}.
Under BIC,
fxi (N,u
T
N , C)− fxi (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j) = fxj (N,uTN , C)− fxj (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i)
for all j ∈ Cq\i. Hence,X
j∈Cq\i
¡
fxi (N,u
T
N , C)− fxi (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j)
¢
=
X
j∈Cq\i
¡
fxj (N,u
T
N , C)− fxj (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i)
¢
.
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Rearranging terms, (|Cq|− 1) fxi
¡
N,uTN , C
¢
=
=
X
j∈Cq\i
¡
fxj (N,u
T
N , C)− fxj (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i) + fxi (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j)
¢
. (2)
On the other hand, by Proposition 15,
fxj (N, u
N
N , C) = αq for all j ∈ Cq ∈ C (3)
where αq = 1|N | (if f
x satisfies ESUG) and αq = 1|Cq ||C| (if f
x satisfies
IPSUG).
Hence,X
j∈N\Cq
fxj (N,u
T
N , C) (1)=
X
j∈N\Cq
fxj (N,u
N
N , C) (3)=
X
Cr∈C\Cq
|Cr|αr.
Moreover, by Eff ,X
j∈Cq\i
fxj (N,u
T
N , C) = uTN(N)− fxi (N, uTN , C)−
X
Cr∈C\Cq
|Cr|αr.
Since uTN(N) = 1,X
j∈Cq\i
fxj (N, u
T
N , C) = 1− fxi (N,uTN , C)−
X
Cr∈C\Cq
|Cr|αr.
It is not diﬃcult to check that 1−
P
Cr∈C\Cq |Cr|αr = βq (defined in the
previous case). HenceX
j∈Cq\i
fxj (N,u
T
N , C) = βq − fxi (N, uTN , C).
Replacing this expression in (2),
(|Cq|− 1)fxi (N,uTN , C) = βq − fxi (N,uTN , C)−
P
j∈Cq\i
fxj (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i)
+
P
j∈Cq\i
fxi (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j).
Rearranging terms:
|Cq| fxi (N, uTN , C) = βq −
X
j∈Cq\i
fxj (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i) +
X
j∈Cq\i
fxi (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j).
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And so, fxi (N, u
T
N , C) =
1
|Cq|

βq −
X
j∈Cq\i
fxj (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i) +
X
j∈Cq\i
fxi (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j)


But by induction hypothesis:
f1j (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i) = f2j (N\i, uTN\i, CN\i)
and
f1i (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j) = f2i (N\j, uTN\j, CN\j)
for all j 6= i. Hence we conclude that f1i (N,uTN , C) = f2i (N,uTN , C).
Remark 20 In parts a and c we need to add IS. Take for example the
coalitional value F given by F (N, v, C) = Sh [Shω] (N, v, C) if {1, 2} /∈ C or
{3} /∈ C. When {1, 2} , {3} ∈ C, take Fi (N, v, C) = Sh [Shω]i (N, v, C) for all
i ∈ N\ {1, 2} and moreover
F1 (N, v, C) = Sh [Shω]1 (N, v, C) + v ({3})
F2 (N, v, C) = Sh [Shω]2 (N, v, C)− v ({3}) .
This coalitional value satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, BIC, Co and ESUG,
but fails IS.
Analogously, define the coalitional value F 0 as before, but taking Sh (Sh)
instead of Sh [Shω]. Then, F 0 satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, NBIC, Co and
IPSUG, but fails IS.
6 Independence of the axioms
In this section we show that the axioms used in Theorem 18 are independent.
The Aumann-Drèze value Sh (In) satisfies Lin, INC, Co, BIC, NBIC,
IPSUG, ESUG, IS and fails Eff .
Define the bounded egalitarian value BE asBEi (N, v) = v (N) / |Carr (N, v)|
if i ∈ Carr (N, v) and BEi (N, v) = 0 otherwise.
Sh (BE) satisfies Eff , INC, Co, BIC, NBIC, IPSUG, IS and fails
Lin.
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Define the egalitarian value E as Ei (N, v) = v (N) / |N | for all i ∈ N .
Sh (E) satisfies Eff , Lin, Co, BIC, NBIC, IPSUG, IS and fails INC.
Take the coalitional value G given by G (N, v, C) = Sh (Sh) (N, v, C) if
{3, 4} /∈ C, 1, 2 /∈ N or 1, 2 ∈ N and they belong to the same coalition in C.
When {3, 4} ∈ C, 1, 2 ∈ N and 1, 2 do not belong to the same coalition in C,
take Gi (N, v, C) = Sh (Sh)i (N, v, C) for all i ∈ N\ {1, 2} and moreover
G1 (N, v, C) = Sh (Sh)1 (N, v, C) + δv{1,2,3}
G2 (N, v, C) = Sh (Sh)2 (N, v, C)− δv{1,2,3}
where δv{1,2,3} := v ({1, 2, 3})−v ({1, 2})−v ({1, 3})−v ({2, 3})+v (1)+v (2)+
v (3) is the Harsanyi dividend for u{1,2,3}N . This coalitional value G satisfies
Eff , Lin, INC, BIC, IPSUG, IS and fails Co.
E (Sh) satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, Co, IPSUG, IS and fails both BIC
and NBIC.
Sh hShωi satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, Co, BIC, IS and fails IPSUG.
Sh [Shω] satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, Co, NBIC, IS and fails IPSUG.
The second coalitional value presented in Remark 20 satisfies Eff , Lin,
INC, Co, NBIC, IPSUG and fails IS.
Define the weighted bounded egalitarian value BEω as BExi (N, v) =
xiv (N) /
P
j∈Carr(N,v) xj if i ∈ Carr (N, v) and BExi (N, v) = 0 otherwise,
for all x ∈ RN++.
Sh [BEω] satisfies Eff , INC, Co, NBIC, ESUG, IS and fails Lin.
Sh hBEωi satisfies Eff , INC, Co, BIC, ESUG and fails Lin.
Sh [Eω] satisfies Eff , Lin, Co, NBIC, ESUG, IS and fails INC.
Sh hEωi satisfies Eff , Lin, Co, BIC, ESUG and fails INC.
The coalitional Shapley value Sh satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, NBIC, BIC,
ESUG, IS and fails Co.
E [Shω] satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, Co, ESUG, IS and fails both NBIC
and BIC.
The Owen value Sh (Sh) satisfies Eff , Lin, INC, Co, NBIC, BIC, IS
and fails ESUG.
The coalitional value F presented in Remark 20 satisfies Eff , Lin, INC,
Co, NBIC, ESUG and fails IS.
In the following table we summarize the results presented in this Section:
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Eff Lin INC BIC NBIC Co ESUG/IPSUG IS
Sh (Sh) OK∗+ OK∗+ OK∗+ OK∗ OK+ OK∗+ IPSUG∗+ OK+
Sh [Shω] OK∗ OK∗ OK∗ no OK∗ OK∗ ESUG∗ OK∗
Sh hShωi OK∗ OK∗ OK∗ OK∗ no OK∗ ESUG∗ OK
Sh (In) no OK OK OK OK OK BOTH OK
Sh (BE) OK no OK OK OK OK IPSUG OK
Sh (E) OK OK no OK OK OK IPSUG OK
G OK OK OK OK OK no IPSUG OK
E (Sh) OK OK OK no no OK IPSUG OK
F 0 OK OK OK no OK OK IPSUG no
Sh [BEω] OK no OK no OK OK ESUG OK
Sh hBEωi OK no OK OK no OK ESUG OK
Sh [Eω] OK OK no no OK OK ESUG OK
Sh hEωi OK OK no OK no OK ESUG OK
Sh OK OK OK OK OK no ESUG OK
E [Shω] OK OK OK no no OK ESUG OK
F OK OK OK no OK OK ESUG no
Table 1: Properties satisfied by the coalitional values. “*” (resp. “+”)
means that this property together with the others with “*” (resp. “+”) in
the line, characterizes the coalitional value.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we characterize three generalizations of the Shapley value. As
for the Owen value, one of its most controversial properties is that of sym-
metry in the game among coalitions. In our characterization, this symmetry
is in fact implied by IPSUG. Other characterizations of the Owen value
also include some property that leads to this symmetry. This is the case of
property A3 in the original characterization by Owen (1977); the coalitional
symmetry in Winter (1989) and Albizuri (2008); the intermediate game prop-
erty in Peleg (1989), called game between coalitions property in Winter (1992)
and quotient game property in Vázquez-Brage et al. (1997); the property of
symmetry among coalitions in Zhang (1995); the property of block strong
symmetry in Amer and Carreras (1995), called balanced contributions in the
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coalitions in Calvo et al. (1996); the property of symmetry in Chae and
Heidhues (2004); and the properties of unanimity coalitional game, symme-
try between exchangeable coalitions and coalitional symmetry in the various
characterizations presented in Bergantiños et al. (2007).
Hart and Kurz (1983) presented an alternative characterization of the
Owen value without the property of symmetry in the game among coali-
tions. Instead, they used a property of Carrier, which implies that the value
should not be aﬀected by the presence of null players. Various axiomatic
characterizations of the Owen value also use this property: Hamiache (1999
and 2001), Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2004), and Albizuri (2008).
One may wonder whether the Carrier axiom is a reasonable requirement
in games with coalition structure. Since null players aﬀect the size of the
coalition, we should admit that they are not so null (as far as we accept
that size is important). Take for example the unanimity game
¡
N,uSN
¢
with
N = {1, 2, 3} and S = {1, 2}. Take C = {{1} , {2, 3}}. This game models
the following situation, as described in Hart and Kurz (1983):
As an everyday example of such a situation, “I will have to
check this with my wife/husband” may (but not necessarily) lead
to a better bargaining position, due to the fact that the other
party has to convince both the player and the spouse.
The Owen value would simply ignore the presence of player 3:
Sh (Sh)
¡
N,uSN , C
¢
=
µ
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
¶
.
In this example, the role of the symmetry in the game among coalitions
is clear: since both {1} and {2, 3} are equally necessary to get a positive
payoﬀ, this payoﬀ should be shared equally among them, irrespectively of
their respective size. This idea is appropriate to describe situations where
the negotiations take place among representatives with the same power of
negotiation.
As opposed, Sh [Shω] would assign twice as much to coalition {2, 3} than
to coalition {1}, but still maintaining the null player property:
Sh [Shω]
¡
N,uSN , C
¢
=
µ
1
3
,
2
3
, 0
¶
.
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This idea is appropriate to describe situations where the power of nego-
tiation among coalitions depend on their size. One may think for example
on political parties that join forces in a Parliament, maintaining however
their respective proposal prerogatives. In fact, Kalandrakis (2006) shows
that proposal making has a very significant impact on outcomes.
Notice that player 2 would only expect to get 1
2
in case player 3 be not
present. Hence, the benefit of cooperation between players 2 and 3 is 2
3
− 1
2
=
1
6
. Sh hShωi proposes to share this benefit equally between players 2 and 3:
Sh hShωi ¡N, uSN , C¢ = µ13 , 712 , 112
¶
.
In this case, the null player property is not satisfied. However, one may
find examples of real situations where this null player property also fails.
Consider the Basque Country5 Parliament that arose in 2001 election. Five
parties got representation: Coalition EAJ-PNV / EA, Partido Popular (PP),
Partido Socialista de Euskadi - Euskadiko Ezquerra (PSE-EE / PSOE), Eu-
skal Herritarrok (EH) and Ezker Batua-Izquierda Unida (EB-IU). The num-
ber of representatives is given in Table 2. The number of seats needed to win
a vote is 38.
Party Number of Seats
EAJ-PNV / EA 33
PP 19
PSE-EE / PSOE 13
EH 7
EB-IU 3
Table 2: Number of seats in the Basque Country Parliament.
Even though EB-IU is a null player in the associated voting game6, a minority
government was formed with the coalition of EAJ-PNV / EA and EB-IU.
Whatever the reason for this decision could be, it suggests that null players
can also play a significant role.
5Autonomous community of Spain.
6This game is defined as v (S) = 1 if the members of S sum up at least 38 seats, and
v (S) = 0 otherwise.
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